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Medical tort falls short in court
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, TexWe don’t have the luxury of sitting down to read the equa-
tion that governs the universe; we just observe data and
make an assumption about what the real process might be,
and “calibrate” by adjusting our equation in accordance
with additional information.
Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan
Consider you were named in a malpractice lawsuit
as part of a shotgun strategy; the lawsuit included every
physician whose name appeared in the medical record.
The hospitalist, who consulted you, did, in your opin-
ion, engage in malpractice, having administered the
fatal therapy you warned against. Your attorney’s re-
quest for your dismissal from the suit was refused
because the plaintiff’s expert, a nonsurgeon, assured
the plaintiff’s attorney you did the wrong operation, at
the wrong time, for the wrong reasons. But you did not
operate on that patient; the procedure was aborted
when anesthetic problems developed in the OR. Be-
cause of your excellent rapport with the family, they
asked you to take charge when they dismissed the
hospitalist. The defense attorney is trying to settle and
hopes that he can get you off the hook as part of a pretrial
settlement, but there are no guarantees. What should
you do?
A. File a complaint with the state medical board against the
“expert” and wait it out.
B. Counter sue the “expert witness.”
C. Counter sue the plaintiff’s attorney.
D. Counter sue the family.
E. Wait it out.
Discussing malpractice tort’s merits is, among physi-
cians, as welcome as a traffic ticket, because there seem so
few. The goals of the malpractice tort system are, foremost,
to compensate those who have been negligently injured
and to improve medical care by punishing, or at least
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rently achieved.
It would seem logical that if there was no medical
malpractice there would be no malpractice lawsuits. But
perfecting medical practice will not solve the legal malprac-
tice problem! An epidemiologist studied models allowing
rates of medical negligence to be changed and concluded,
“even substantial improvements in rates of negligent injury
will not lead to a large reduction in claims rates.”1 In
reviewing 500 malpractice cases from the United Kingdom,
a much more conservative legal environment than the
United States (US), only 19% were considered to involve
incompetent care.2 In a large multistate US study, 46% of
those awarded judgments did not experience malpractice as
a cause, and 41% of those suing and compensated did not
experience an adverse practice event.3 Further studies con-
firmed this: almost half of successful suits were from cases
with incorrect allegations,2 and about half of cases that
received monetary awards had no clinical errors.4 More
disturbing, of the billions of dollars doled out by insurers,
ostensibly to compensate alleged victims of malpractice, an
astounding 88% went to plaintiff and defense attorneys and
trial costs.5 The system is broken; it is a failed Rube Gold-
berg machine consuming huge resources and producing
injustice. Presently, a coin toss appears to be equal to the
courts at achieving medical malpractice justice, and is very
much cheaper.
Aside from the failure to identify and to compensate
patients injured by malpractice, the punitive aspect of
the medical tort system does not serve to improve care.6
Its specter subliminally nudges physicians into the more
expensive practice of defensive medicine, because over-
documented care protects against retrospective legal
“should have dones.”
The filing and pursuit of cases punishes guilty and
innocent physicians alike. The psychological effects cause
alterations in practice profiles, consideration of early retire-
ment in the most experienced, and the discouraging of
others to enter medicine.7 And this fetid fallout lasts for
years.
The medical and legal systems are considered among
the most professional in existence, have been around as
long as societies have been, have developed over millennia,
and are called upon to provide answers to societies’ most
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ciples, a process that has accrued reliability over millennia,
and a belief that truth is an asymptote, as real but unattain-
able as the horizon. Medicine corrects undesirable alter-
ations in the human body by additional, albeit more de-
sirable, alterations; whereas, the judicial system settles
differences through imposing an additional structured
adversarial system. Both force decisions on the basis of
the preponderance of evidence, not absolute truth.
Where exactly is the failure in the legal management of
medical tort?
The answer to why such a learned system fails so
dreadfully regarding medical tort is that the legal system
depends entirely on medical experts being honest and
accurate, not the shifty deceivers currently populating the
witness stands. The legal system relies on the threat of
perjury to keep the witnesses honest, but opinion is im-
mune to inquiry; one cannot examine within a witness’
mind concerning whether or not he believes his expressed
opinion. The question under consideration is how to make
medical experts witness objectively.
When approached by potential plaintiffs wanting to sue
their doctor, the attorney will screen most out and file a
lawsuit in only about 3% of those interviewed.8 In a survey
of 113 plaintiffs’ medical malpractice attorneys, most
ranked the economic burden of the injury (size of damages)
and the potential for compensation as the factors most
influencing their decisions to file suit on behalf of clients.9
Justice? No, it’s the money stupid! These attorneys did not
mention that their decision depended on the certainty of
malpractice proposed by their expert; no, but in 100% of
malpractice actions formally filed by a sensible attorney, a
well-compensated physician expert reviewed the medical
records and advised the plaintiff’s attorney that his potential
client was indeed a victim of medical malpractice. This is, of
course, a conclusion that all parties to the filing are glad to
hear and precipitates the filing.
The system has an abundance of professional experts
who find a comfortable supplement to their livelihoods by
encouraging attorneys to pursue malpractice cases, search
the internet. When large panels of uninvolved practicing
physicians reviewed malpractice cases and defendants’ as
well as plaintiffs’ expert testimonies, they disagreed with
65% of the “expert’s” conclusions.10 This provides evi-
dence that expert testimony inaccurately depicts the medi-
cal community’s standard of care. Even when an honest
medical expert comes to the conclusion that a physician
defendant is innocent or guilty, it is difficult to avoid
becoming a member of the “team” and trying to “win.”
Carefully sculpted subjectivity allows “advocacy creep”
which has a real danger of morphing into pseudoscientific
testimony.
The looseness of the “standard of care concept” com-
pounds the problem.11 Accomplished experts smooge the
jury so when they deliver the coup de grace that the standard
of care was or was not met, they will be believed. Spencer
noted these inherent system flaws when, “expert witnesses
are actively pursued for their views, their presentation style,and their willingness to tailor their testimony according to
the particular needs of the case.”12 Attorneys understand
that the determination of malpractice is made neither
by them nor by their experts; it is made by a lay jury
weighing the credibility of medical experts for the plaintiffs
and defendants who typically give contradictory testimo-
nies that are unscientific enough to slur the system. The
most important characteristics of a medical expert for suc-
cess in the courtroom, therefore, lie in his or her personal
manner and believability. A convincing argument is made
in a recent book that deceptiveness has a survival value;
primitives who could suspend reality to their advantage
could get more than their share of resources and avoid
self-sacrifice that honest tribesmen would altruistically
take.13 Are dishonest experts and politicians evolutionary
end points?
State medical boards possess legal authority to regulate
medical practice and many consider expert witnessing as
practicing medicine; all but 10 states and Puerto Rico
require a medical license for validation as an expert.14 In
addition to a license, only five states require board certifi-
cation in the area of testimony, six require training in the
same specialty, and three require that the expert “have the
same skills” as the defendant. Option A, according to
the Federation of State Medical Boards, would be the
correct answer in barely three progressive states, North and
South Carolina and possibly Mississippi. Fraudulent experts
can be disciplined for inaccurate testimony in the Carolinas,
and if the expert witness can be disqualified by past unpro-
fessionalism, he or she can be disciplined in Mississippi.14
Most attorneys would advise that the only basis for legal
countersuit would be libel, primarily against the flawed
opinion of the expert witness. You would bear the financial
and emotional costs without chance of recovery since no
monetary loss would have accrued, a Pyrrhic victory at best.
Occasional reports of successful countersuits by physicians
emerge but it is rare and against considerable odds, elimi-
nating options B, C, and D.
The medical profession’s depressing malpractice strat-
egy involves threats that if the states do not come forward
with legislative limits of awards, their medical care will
suffer. One likely possibility is that the 3% of those injured
by malpractice now filing suits will shrink even further.
Medical malpractice is the one carbuncle medical profes-
sionalism ignores. Justice is represented as a two-sided
scale; those injured through negligent care should be com-
pensated. It would be exceedingly rare, and perhaps con-
sidered insane, should a physician state that a plaintiff’s
award was too low. If, however, medicine concedes two
sobering facts and acts justly, medical professionalism will
be more complete: first, there are bad doctors who practice
medicine badly and good doctors who on rare occasions
make mistakes; and that patients harmed by either sufficient
that their lives or livelihoods are damaged should receive
reasonable compensation.
Complaints can be made about expert witnessing to a
number of our surgical societies but they are rare, limited to
members, have limited punishments, have little publicity
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tiveness. The Society of Vascular Surgery, as do other
surgical organizations, has procedural guidelines for filing,
adjudication, and that is a good necessary baby-step not a
cure.
There are several considerations for a possible cure:
individual experts or panels could be appointed by the
courts as independent agents; a no-fault system such as
New Zealand’s could be instituted, or more state oversight
departments formed with the legal authority to punish
bogus experts on both sides or all the above.
Gad, the correct option is E. Once the lawsuit is filed, a
painful relentless process drags on for years, accumulates
reams of expensive documentation, and weighs on the
mind of the innocent unjustly, probably in excess of the
guilty. Maximized injustice, no?
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